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CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW ACT
I. Introduction
California's Family Law Act1 has been heralded as the first
major change in the State's divorce provisions in one hundred
years.2 The Act is an attempt to remedy two major criticisms of
current divorce practice both in California and throughout the
United States. First, those advocating reform believe that laws
controlling the granting of divorces are in conflict with modem
concepts of marriage and divorce. 3 Many divorce laws impose
punitive sanctions in an attempt to deter those who would other-
wise seek a divorce. Second, notwithstanding their intent, divorce
laws have not, in fact, reduced the frequency of divorce. 4 The
inability of current divorce laws to help solve family problems
'CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (Deering Supp. 1970). The Act grew out of the work of
former California Governor Edmund Brown's Commission on the Family, which was
charged with the task of reconciling the laws controlling divorce with the actual
causes and effects of marital breakdown. The Commission was also to propose means
through which the causes of the rising rate of divorce could be analyzed and the
numbers of those seeking divorces diminished. (REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COM-
MISSION ON THE FAMILY, Dec. 1966 at I) [hereinafter cited as REPORT.] The Com-
mission premised its studies on the view that the family was the basic unit of society
which courts had the responsibility of protecting, and set as its goal the furtherance of
family stability by "preventing divorce where it is not warranted, and ... reducing its
harmful effects where it is necessary." See REPORT at 5, 7, 26-3 1.2Grunsky, The Family Law Act, 19 THE BRIEFCASE 2, (Nov.-Dec. 1969); San Francisco
Examiner, July 28, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
3See notes 14 and 15 infra.4STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., 1969, Table 54, "Live Births, Deaths, Marriages,
and Divorces: 1910 to 1968," at 47. While the national rate leveled off in the fifties, it
increased from 2.2% in 1960 to 2.9% in 1968 and during the same period in California
the rate rose from 3.1% to 3.7%. In 1960 there were 393,000 divorces; in 1968,
582,000. See Table 78 "Marriages, 1950, 1960, and 1968 and Divorces 1960 and
1966.-"Number and Rate by State" at 61. However, Hammer, Divorce Reform in
California, 9 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 32, 34 (1968) comments that while the absolute
number of divorces has increased, the rate has remained "relatively constant" and
should not be described as "soaring."
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and lower the divorce rate, the growing concern with the in-
creasing numbers of children affected by divorce, 5 and the in-
ability of the courts to deal adequately with the heavy load of
divorce cases have all contributed to the impetus for divorce law
reform.
Proposals for divorce reform have been advanced by numerous
judges who feel that the legal system must provide the means for
helping couples solve their marital problems. In the past, judges
have often refused to assume the role of marriage counselor in the
belief that this was not a proper court function. This tendency has
diminished, however, with the growing realization that many in-
dividuals who come before the courts do not actually desire a
divorce but do seek counseling. Indeed, a number of judges today
believe that a large percentage of couples resort to the legal
system because they are unwilling to make use of formal or
informal marital services available outside the courts.6 The
courts' lack of success in providing assistance to these couples
has contributed to the growing desire for reform.
While a few states have modified their divorce laws, 7 California
5 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEPT, H.E.W. DIVORCE STATISTICS
ANALYSIS, U.S., 1962, 1965 at 3,27. The percentage of divorces in which children
are involved grew 15% from 1953 to 1962 and the average number of children
involved in each such divorce also increased. The report indicates that the increasing
involvement of children was primarily due to the growth of the proportion of divorces
with children and to a lesser extent an increase in the ratio of children per divorce.
The percentage of decrees with children rose from 45.5% in 1953 to 60.2% in 1962.
The ratio of children per divorce with children increased only from 1.86 to 2.14. An
attendant problem involving children of divorced parents is the higher rate of juvenile
delinquency. REPORT at 5.6 Mclntyre, Conciliation of Disrupted Marriages By or Through the Judiciary, 4 J. Fam. L.
117, 118 (1964).
7The following are a few of the states that have made changes in their divorce laws: New
York, which had previously only allowed divorce on grounds of adultery, in 1969
changed its laws to permit divorce on grounds recognized by most states, N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 170 (Supp. 1969). North Carolina, (N.C. GEN. STAT., § 50-5 (4) (1965))
and Virginia, (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (1964)) have enacted non-fault separation
statutes. Oklahoma, (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271(7) (1961)) added in-
compatibility as a ground for divorce. Texas has also attempted to reform its divorce
laws. Basically, the non-fault ground of "insupportability" was added to the previous
law, although this was cast in the form of a unification of law relating to the family.
TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 1.01-5.86 (Vernon Supp. 1969). Under the new Texas divorce
law, then, there exists a dual standard for divorce: the old fault grounds and the new
ground of insupportability. Unless the fault grounds are eliminated, this dual standard
will just result in the perpetuation of the hypocrisy that has existed. For an analysis of
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is the first state to completely revise its divorce legislation. The
Family Law Act makes significant changes both in the substan-
tive laws governing the granting of divorce and in the procedures
to be followed in obtaining it. The changes enacted, reflect a new
approach to divorce which may at least partially answer much of
the criticism leveled at current divorce practice.
II. Pre-1970 Divorce
In the past, California followed the "marital fault" doctrine in
divorce proceedings and granted divorces only to the "innocent
party" after a showing of specific acts of misconduct by the
offending spouse. The theory behind the fault doctrine is that
certain acts are regarded as being fundamen-
tally incompatible with the undertakings en-
tered into at marriage; the commission of
these acts by one party to the marriage gives
to the other party an option to have the mar-
riage terminated by divorce. 8
The grounds usually included under the doctrine-adultery, ex-
treme cruelty, wilful desertion, wilful neglect, habitual in-
temperance, conviction of a felony- were specified by statute.9 A
party seeking a divorce was required to file a lengthy, accusatory
"complaint", in which the "plaintiff" alleged acts committed by
the "defendant. '" 10 The latter, in contesting the divorce action,
could allege as a complete defense connivance, condonation,
recrimination or laches.1
the Texas act, see McKnight, Recodification and Reform of the Law of Husband and
Wife, 33 TEx. B.J. 34 (1970).
8
REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, (Comd. 9678) para. 56.
9CAL. Civ. CODE, § 92 (repealed 1970). The only non-fault ground specified was incurable
insanity.
'
0CAL. Civ. CODE § 92, see form included therein. (Repealed 1970.)
1 CAL. Clv. CODE § 111-33 (repealed 1970). Connivance is the passive permission of the
acts alleged, when done with intent to procure the acts committed. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 112, 113 (repealed 1970). Collusion is the agreement by spouses that one of them
shall commit or claim to have committed acts which are grounds for divorce for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. CAL. CIV. CODE § 114 (repealed
1970). Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense.CAL. Civ. CODE § 115-121
(repealed 1970). Recrimination is a showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce
against the plaintiff. CAL. CIV. CODE § 122 (repealed 1970).
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The adversary nature of the pleading was often criticized as
causing further polarization of the parties rather than encouraging
reconciliation. 12 Subject to even greater criticism, however, was
the necessity of establishing some matrimonial offense in order to
obtain a divorce. This requirement forced the court to concen-
trate upon a superficial "pigeonholing" of the parties' relationship
into one of the statutory grounds, and impeded the court's inquiry
into the real causes of marital breakdown.13 In addition, the
marital fault doctrine was felt to be unrealistic in its attempt to
place the blame for the breakdown entirely on the individual
committing the specified act. 14
In practice, the courts applied a broad interpretation of the
statutory grounds. The ground of extreme cruelty was broadened
almost beyond recognition."5 Yet, despite such interpretation, the
requirement of fitting within one of the grounds continued to pose
a substantial hurdle to many divorce-seekers. To obtain a divorce,
some parties were forced to stage hotel scenes, commit perjury,
12REPORT at 18.
1 3Id., at 27-30. See also PUTTING ASUNDER, A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY, The Report of a Group Appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury (1966)
at 28-9, [hereinafter cited as PUTTING ASUNDER]. The Report criticizes the unreason-
able reliance of the fault doctrine on the committing of a matrimonial offense. It states
that
(t)here are all sorts ot other ways in which the situ-
ation created by (say) an act of adultery might be
dealt with by the two persons concerned. So in
reality it is only if they fail to deal with it in any of
those other ways that there is a case for divorce;
and that means that it is not the matrimonial offence
in itself that should be the reason for dissolving the
marriage, but only the ultimate failure of the rela-
tionship between the two to bear the stress put
upon it.
4 Couch, Toward a More Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TULANE L. REV. 243 (1969). Couch
comments that most divorce laws "are designed to give an innocent party a right
against a guilty party. Though a few cases may fall within this posture, we know that
many factors, conscious and unconscious, expressed and unexpressed, are generally
involved in the breakdown of a marriage... (and) usually ... both parties are at
fault," at 255. See also A Divorce Reform Act 5 HARV. J. LEG. 563, 564, 568
(1968); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32,
35-39 (1966); and PUTTING ASUNDER at 30-1.
15REPORT at 30-1. "96% of California's divorces are sought and granted on the grounds of
extreme cruelty, 94% of these hearings are uncontested." these facts indicate that
many courts have probably been granting divorces on a less stringent standard than
might be apparent under the statute.
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or seek their divorce in another forum solely because their actions
did not come within one of the statutory categories. 16
Furthermore, there existed a significant dissimilarity between
the theory and the application of the divorce laws. 17 According to
a literal reading of the prior statute, divorce was to be denied if
the court found both parties "guilty" of acts against the marriage,
or if they had colluded in seeking the action.18 In practice, how-
ever, the parties were not precluded from obtaining a divorce.
The rule followed was stated by Justice Traynor in Deburgh v.
Deburgh:19
(P)ublic policy does not discourage divorce
where the relations between husband and
wife are such that the legitimate objects of
matrimony have been utterly destroyed.20
Rather than denying a divorce, a "marital breakdown" test was
applied when both parties had committed one of the specific acts,
and the courts thereby deftly avoided the literal mandate of the
statute.21
To remedy these problems, the Governor's Commission on the
Family recommended changes in both law and court procedures.
The State Assembly agreed with the Commission's recommenda-
tions, and decided to establish a criteria which, hopefully, would
.
0Couch, supra note 14, at 254. He comments that
(I)t is doubtful if strict divorce laws are actually
much of a deterrent; if a couple's marriage has
failed, but for reasons which do not come within the
rigid categories by the divorce law of their state,
they will probably get a divorce in any case, but
their state's law will simply limit the alternatives
open to them: they can stay in their own state and
collude and commit perjury as to grounds ... (or)
one of them can go to a quickie divorce state and
there commit perjury as to domicile and possibly as
to grounds; if they cannot afford this, the husband
can simply abandon the wife.
17Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1205, 1219 (1968),
PUTTING ASUNDER at 30, and REPORT at 29.
'
8 Wadlington, supra note 15, at 38-39.
19 DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P. 2d 598 (1952).
2039 Cal. 2d at 864, 250 P. 2d at 601.2
'Kay, supra note 18, at 1216-1217.
May 19701
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more accurately reflect the actual reasons underlying marital
breakdowns. 22
III. The Family Law Act of 1970
The Family Law Act of 1970 adopts new terms, procedures,
and standards in its attempt to deal properly with family prob-
lems. Indeed, even terminology has been made less adversarial in
an effort to eliminate unnecessary rancor between the parties.23
The procedural requirements generally have been simplified. In
contrast to the complex complaint required under the prior law,
for example, all proceedings under the Family Law Act are com-
menced with the filing of a simple petition which stipulates one of
the statutory grounds sufficient for the cause of action. 24 The Act
reduces the residency requirements from one year to six
months, 2 5 and the interlocutory period to six months.26 Since a
non-resident will still be required to wait a year before he receives
a divorce, these time reductions assist California residents in
obtaining a divorce without transforming California into an easy
divorce state for nonresidents.
During the proceedings, the court has discretion to issue a
continuance of up to thirty days if it feels that reconciliation of
the parties is possible. 27 The court also has authority to issue
orders restraining the transfer or encumberance of property, ex-
cluding one party from the home, providing for the temporary
support of either party or any children, and other appropriate
temporary orders.28 It is, however, the revision of substantive
standards which marks the Act as a significant reform of law.
22CAL. ASSEMBLY J., Aug. 8, 1969 at 8057.
23The term "divorce" has been completely eliminated and the term "dissolution of
marriage" is substituted. To make the pleadings less adversarial, a "petition" is filed
instead of a "complaint," and the other party is now the "respondent" rather than the
"defendant." The terms "voidable marriage" or "judgment of nullity" have been
substituted for the word "annulment." Also the Act uses "legal separation" and
"support" instead of "separate maintenance" and "alimony."24CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4450; 4503 (Deering Supp. 1970). In those counties which have
established a conciliation court, the parties are also required to file the marriage
questionnaires. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4505.
2'CAL. Civ. CODE § 4530 (a) (Deering Supp. 1970).
26CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4514.2 7
CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4508.
2 8CAL. CIV. CODE, §§ 4516, 4518.
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A. Dissolution of Marriage
Dissolution of marriage will be granted only on two grounds:
"irreconcilable differences, which have caused the irremediable
breakdown of the marriage," and "incurable insanity." 29 The
grounds are to be pleaded generally and, in most cases, evidence
of specific acts of misconduct will not be admitted. 30 These
changes were mainly premised on the hope that such proceedings
would not generate a bitterness that might destroy a marriage
which could otherwise be saved. 31 Following this same philoso-
phy, the need for a corroborative witness has been eliminated 32
and eavesdropping evidence will no longer be permitted.33
While the new Act's emphasis is directed toward determining
dissolution through an investigation of the overall condition of the
marriage rather than the mere showing of matrimonial offenses,
the test to be used in determining whether irreconcilable
differences exist is unclear. The statute defines irreconcilable
differences as "those grounds which are determined by the court
to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and
which make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved." 34
This definition, possibly the result of a compromise made during
negotiations on the bill, is circular and of little practical assis-
tance.35 Such a standard, though, was what was desired, for it
29CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4506. Under prior law, a person seeking divorce on grounds of
insanity had to wait for his incompetent spouse to be confined to an institution for
three years before a divorce action could be initiated; CAL. CIv. CODE, § 108,
(repealed 1970). Now, all the petitioner need show is that the spouse was incurably
insane at the time the petition was filed and remains so at the time of the hearing.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4510 (Deering Supp. 1970). These same two grounds will also
permit the legal separation of the parties but only where both of them consent to the
order, see § 4508(b). Legal separation was not viewed with favor by the Commis-
sion which felt that it prolonged an uncertain marital status and led to the "promotion
of illicit relationships" and "the evasion of support obligations." See REPORT at 33.30CAL. CIV. CODE § § 4509, 4506. (Deering Supp. 1970).31Dinkelspiel & Gough, The Case for a Family Court, I FAM. L. Q. sec. 3, 70 at 74
(1967).32CAL. Civ. CODE § 130 (repealed 1970).
3 3CAL. Civ. CODE, § 4520 (Deering Supp. 1970).34CAL. CIv. CODE, § 4507.
35CALIF. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW
ACT PRACTICE, at 120 (1970). [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY'S GUIDE].
May 1970]
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would give the courts the broad discretion needed to determine
whether a particular marriage should be dissolved.
It seems likely that the procedure, as well as the substantive
allegations, to be used in determining the existence of irreconcil-
able differences, will depend upon whether the proceeding is
contested. One commentator has suggested that when the divorce
is uncontested, all the court need do is ask the petitioner whether
he believes his marriage has broken down. If the petitioner so
testifies, dissolution will be ordered and conciliation will no longer
be an alternative.36 Where the divorce is contested, additional
proof may be necessary to show that there are substantial
grounds for dissolution. Even in this situation, however, the legis-
lative hearings indicate that the absolute, unilateral refusal of one
spouse to live with the other constitutes an irreconcilable
difference, notwithstanding a conciliatory attitude of the other
party.3 7 If courts pay heed to the legislature's suggestion in con-
tested proceedings, proof of irreconcilable differences should be
considerably simplified.38
B. Child Custody and Support
0
The court may authorize a custody investigation in any pro-
ceeding in which child custody is involved.3 9 Normally, custody
will be awarded to one of the parents, but the court is authorized
to award custody to a third party upon a finding that an award to
a parent would be detrimental to the child's best interests.
40
361d., at 129-30.
37CAL. ASSEMBLY J., Aug. 8, 1969 at 8058.38See ATTORNEY'S GUIDE at 132.39CAL. CIV. CODE § 4602 (Deering Supp. 1970). The investigator's report, however, is to
be considered by the court in making its custody decision only upon stipulation of all
interested parties.4 01n awarding custody of a child of "tender years," the maternal preference has been
maintained, while the paternal preference for an older child has been abolished. Also,
the child's own wishes will be taken into account if he is deemed "old enough to
indicate an intelligent preference." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (Deering Supp. 1970).
California's previous rule denied a parent custody only upon a finding of unfitness.
See Hammer, supra note 4, at 5 1. There is some speculation that the new standard
for awarding custody, the detriment test, may result in more awards to third parties on
the belief that a lesser finding of parental fault is now required. See ATTORNEY'S
GUIDE at 171-172.
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The enforcement remedies available for child support orders
have been increased to better protect the child's interest. For
example, when either party has been ordered to provide child
support, the court may implement this order by assigning a por-
tion of that person's wages. 41
Furthermore, when the parent receiving child support pay-
ments is also receiving welfare, the court is required to direct
court supervision for the enforcement of the support payments.42
Both of these measures should assure greater adherence to child
support obligations and should alleviate at least some of the
economic problems faced by children of divorced parents.
C. Property Rights of the Parties
Several significant changes have been made in the provisions
for support of the former spouse. Either party now may be re-
quired to pay support 43 whereas previously only the party against
whom the decree was granted could be so ordered. 44
By making support payments less of a penalty and more de-
pendent on the spouse's actual needs, it is hoped that the courts
will be able to reconcile the parties to the award and thereby
reduce post-dissolution conflict.4 5 It is, of course, questionable
whether a mere change in theory can realistically accomplish a
significant change in human behavior.
The Family Law Act continues prior law46 in permitting the
trial court to base its support award on the circumstances of the
parties. The statute explicitly states two factors to be considered
by the court: the duration of the marriage and the ability of the
supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without in-
terfering with the interests of any children of the parties in the
custody of such spouse.4 7
4"CAL. Civ. CODE, § 4701 (Deering Supp. 1970).
42 CAL. CIv. CODE, § 4702(a).
"CAL. CIV. CODE, § 4801.
"CAL. CIv. CODE, § 139, (repealed 1970). In practice, this prior rule had been mitigated in
Deburgh v. Deburgh, supra note 20, where the court permitted even a guilty party to
receive support when the decree was granted to both parties.
4"REPORT at 47-8.
"See CAL. CIv. CODE, § 139 (Deering Supp. 1970) (repealed 1970).
47CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a) (Deering Supp. 1970).
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Under the Act there will be, in most cases, an equal division of
community property.48 The previous statute had required a "just"
division of the property where the grounds for divorce were
adultery, incurable insanity, or extreme cruelty.49 Not only did
this law frequently impose a penalty on a "guilty" spouse through
unequal division, but it also tended to promote a system of legal-
ized blackmail through which one party was able to use the threat
of revelation of indiscretions to obtain a large property set-
tlement. 50 The Commission felt that the most equitable division of
marital property was unrelated to whatever grounds the parties
had for divorce. 51 In accord with this policy, the statute allows an
unequal division of the property in only two instances: (1) where
the economic circumstances warrant; or (2) where the court finds
that there has been a deliberate misappropriation of the property
by one party to the exclusion of the community property rights of
the other.52
48CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (Deering Supp. 1970). Whether an equal division of the property
will be equitable depends upon the characterization of the spouses' property under
California's community property laws. The factors involved in this characterization
include time of acquisition (before or during the marriage) and the method of acquisi-
tion (e.g., gift, purchase). Property of each spouse may be transferred to the marriage
to become community property. Under the involved rules that have developed, such
transfer may occur unknowingly, or contrary to one's intent. An equal division of the
community property may thus result in a windfall to fortune-hunting spouse who
contributes little materially to the marriage. See Knutson, California's Community
Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study & Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 240
(1966); Note, Characterization of Property in California When Period of Acquisition
Overlaps Creation or Termination of Marital Community, 17 HAST. L. J. 815 (1966).49CAL. CIV. CODE, § 146 (repealed 1970). While the statute itself says that a "just
division" shall be made, this had been interpreted in Eslinger v. Eslinger, 47 Cal. 62
(1873) to mean that the injured party was entitled to more than one half of the
property. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 146, note 14, (repealed 1970). See also Knutson,
supra note 48, at 243, note 18.50California State Senator Grunsky, as quoted in Rose, Divorce, California Style, Calif.
Living, Nov. 16, 1969; at 24.
5 1REPORT at 44-5. See also MacFaden, California's New Divorce Legislation, 3 J. BEV-
ERLY HILLs B. ASS'N 31, 34 (Sept. 1969), commenting that the equal division of
community property was "simply doing equity since the acquisition of the property
has nothing whatsoever to do with the marriage relationship itself or the acts which
caused its dissolution."5 2CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(1) & (2) (Deering Supp. 1970). The first exception covers the
case where actual division of an asset is impractical or impossible (e.g., a going
business), or where equal division of the property would fail to give sufficient protec-
tion to one of the parties. See REPORT at 45. The second exception should apply to
Divorce Law
IV. Evaluation
California's Family Law Act of 1970 is best evaluated by
reference to its stated goals. It was intended that the Act take into
account and deal with the actual causes and effects of divorce.
This was to be accomplished without sacrificing either of two
somewhat conflicting policies: (1) the protection of the parties
involved through eliminating arbitrary standards as well as sim-
plifying and shortening the proceedings; (2) the protection of the
State's interests in preserving marriage by establishing a standard
for granting divorces which would permit dissolution only after a
thorough investigation and finding of marital breakdown.
The elimination of the fault doctrine is a significant accom-
plishment insofar as it eliminates both the unnecessary adversa-
rial approach to divorce proceedings and the hypocrisy that exis-
ted under the prior system. The effect of the substitution of an
irreconcilable differences standard, however, is more difficult to
assess. If courts demand only that the petitioner answer a few
questions concerning the state of the marriage, obtaining a di-
vorce should be considerably facilitated. 53 It is contended that
acrimony and bitterness will be reduced; however, it is not clear
that a change in terminology alone can accomplish this. While
bitterness may be reduced and the process simplified, the proce-
dure itself will give the court no more information concerning the
actual status of the parties' marriage than was previously the
case. Indeed, to the extent that less time will be spent in divorce
proceedings and less substantive corroboration will be demanded,
overt acts of misallocation of the property. It may also apply, however, where the
property has been "deliberately squandered" by one spouse, although this in-
terpretation has been questioned. See ATTORNEY'S GUIDE at 162 rejecting this
position, and CAL. ASSEMBLY J., Aug. 8, 1969 at 8062 supporting it.
The removal of the trial court's discretion to make disproportionate awards, has
been regarded by some as a "more significant variance from the old law" than is the
"no fault" criteria. This change is premised on the theory that in disposing of
property, a dissolution of marriage should be treated like dissolution of a partnership
with the economic circumstances or moral conduct of the parties during their union
having no effect on the division of assets. See ATTORNEY'S GUIDE at 152, 156.
53PuTrING ASUNDER, at 43-44. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 29, 1969, at 8, col. I.
Lawyers who have commented on the statute generally agree that in uncontested
cases much of the bitterness which had characterized divorce proceedings, hurting
both the parties and their children, will be removed.
May 19701
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the court may well obtain less information. It may therefore be
most difficult for the courts to base their decisions on a realistic
appraisal of the marriage. The new grounds for divorce may
simply replace the fault doctrine with a vague standard for di-
vorce that is based on mutual consent, or even unilateral caprice.
Although this result might be desirable, such leniency would run
counter to the State's second reformative goal: preservation of
the marriage and reduction of the current divorce rate. If, how-
ever, the courts demand substantial evidence of irreconcilable
differences, this second goal may be achieved, but only at the cost
of the first.
Moreover, some commentators have expressed the view that
the exceptions under which evidence of specific acts may be
admitted are so broad as to vitiate the goals of the new legisla-
tion.54 For example, the exception allowing misconduct evidence
in determining whether or not a breakdown has occurred is poten-
tially a large loophole. 55 The policy of the Act may also be
subverted by allowing evidence of a party's misconduct under the
guise of showing, for child custody purposes, the party's lack of
qualifications as a parent. The Act has attempted to answer these
problems by prohibiting pleading of specific facts and by author-
izing a private hearing on the issue of custody if the court so
desires. 56 Yet, unless the custody proceedings are conducted by
another court, it would seem impossible to completely eliminate
54 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (Deering Supp. 1970). Misconduct evidence will be admitted
where:
child custody is in issue and such evidence is relevant to
establish that parental custody would be detrimental to
the child or at the hearings where it is determined by the
court to be necessary to establish the existence of irrec-
oncilable differences.
55Goddard, The Proposal for Divorce upon Petition & Without Fault, 43 CAL. BAR 90, 95
(1968). See also Caen, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 5, 1970, at 21, col. 1, for
interviews with private detectives who did marital work. While several interviewees
indicated that they felt their business would be hampered by the law, another stated
that:
"Ji]f you have to show irreconcilable differences, what
better proof is there than a photo of husband or wife
going into a motel with a person who is irreconcilably
different from the respective wife or husband."
5 6
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (Deering Supp. 1970).
[Vol. 3:2
Divorce Law
the influence of specific misconduct testimony on the determina-
tion of irreconcilable differences.
The adoption of a non-fault standard without provision for
counselors may raise a serious problem because the courts will be
handicapped by the absence of qualified assistants to aid them in
determining whether irreconcilable differences actually do exist.57
Much of the impetus behind removal of the fault standard was
premised on the belief that counselors would be provided to help
administer the new standards. Indeed, at least one commentator
has suggested that "the very essence of the breakdown test is the
work of the concilation counselor in attempting to reconcile the
parties." 58 Failure to provide these counselors can in no way be
viewed as aiding the court's decision-making.
In the final analysis, the Act's impact may well depend upon
how much and.what type of evidence is required by the courts to
show irreconciliable differences. With the statutory definition
offering little help, a determination that the parties' difficulties
constitute irreconcilable differences may prove a more difficult
task than anticipated. On the other hand, the vagueness of the
statutory definition does allow the court much flexibility and
freedom in determining the issue. Should irreconciliable
57See REPORT at 18, 82-5. Following the success of the Los Angeles conciliation courts
(See Pfaff, The Conciliation Court of L.A. County, PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF
FAMILY LAW, A.B.A., 1960-1, at 35. Judge Pfaff indicates that counselors were
reconciling 43% of the couples they saw and 75% of these reconciled couples were
living together one year later.) The governor's Commission of the Family had
proposed that the family court judge be assisted by a professional staff of trained
marriage counselors who would aid the judge by interviewing parties desiring a
divorce, counseling them, and submitting recommendations to the court. While the
conciliation courts exist in thirteen counties, the statewide counseling provisions
proposed by the Commission were deleted by the legislature on the basis of factors
such as cost and the difficulty of finding qualified personnel. Additionally, doubt was
raised as to both the effectiveness of mandatory counseling and the propriety of
imposing it on parties to a marriage as a condition for obtaining a divorce. For
comments on the legislative debate, see Grunsky, supra note 2, at 3, and San
Francisco Examiner, June 19, 1969, at 17, col. I. Assemblyman Hayes, one of the
opponents to this section of the bill, stated that counseling was a "completely
unproven method of keeping marriages together." See also Rheinstein, The Law of
Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633, 639 (1956)
questioning whether the state should be given the power to attempt the transforma-
tion through psychiatry of the personality structure of an individual, "simply because
he has failed to make a success out of a marriage with some other individual."
58Goddard, supra note 55, at 10 1.
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differences prove not to be a triable concept under the new
system, the courts may ultimately be forced to fall back on the
fault doctrine as the only manageable decisional tool.5 9
V. Conclusion
In recognizing that divorce should not be prohibited where the
legitimate objects of the marriage have failed, California's new
divorce law reflects a marked change in the State's approach to
domestic relations.
California's goal of simplifying the divorce process should
be realized under the Act. The answer to divorce reform, how-
ever, does not lie solely in making divorce easily obtainable.
When a couple experiences marital difficulties, the state should
make sure that dissolution is not permitted unless continuance of
the marriage is completely untenable. By focusing on the viability
of the marriage instead of looking only to see if certain matrimo-
nial offenses have been committed, California's new grounds for
dissolution provide a sound basis on which this determination can
be made. Yet, in order to assure that dissolution is not granted
too hastily when applying this test, the courts should ascertain
whether the parties have made an honest attempt at reconcilia-
tion.60
Whether California is successful in achieving its second goal of
lowering the incidence of divorce depends upon its ability to
foster reconciliation. California already has conciliation courts
successfully functioning in a number of counties. It is recom-
mended that this type of system be expanded both in coverage
and scope so that such services become available throughout the
State. Use of the family court system should also be further
59PurrING ASUNDER, at 44-45.
6 0Rheinstein, supra note 57, at 660. In assessing whether such efforts have been made by
the parties, the court should look at both their informal and formal attempts at
reconciliation. Because the merits of mandatory counseling are still debated, (see note
57, supra) parties should not be required to seek outside help as a prerequisite to their
divorce; however, voluntary counseling services Should be made available to parties
both before and after they begin a divorce action.
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considered.6 1 While the Family Law Act does represent perhaps
the first honest look at divorce, it is unlikely that it has really
succeeded in reforming the institution of divorce.
Meredith A. Nelson
61The Governor's Commission on the Family had proposed the adoption of a family court
system whose judges were interested in working with family problems, and who
would receive specialized training to help them in these areas. See REPORT at 61-3.
Section 004 of the Commission's proposed Family Court Act specified that judges
were to be chosen by their prior training, interests, and ability. Section 005 proposed
that statewide seminars be conducted regularly to discuss problems in the area. If
adopted, such measures would clearly help promote uniformity of standards through-
out the state.
